# Chapter 14 Protection

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# **Objectives**

- Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern computer system
- Explain how protection domains combined with an access matrix are used to specify the resources a process may access
- Examine capability and language-based protection systems

# **Goals of Protection**

- Computer system consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations.
- Protection problem ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.

### **Principles of Protection**

- Guiding principle principle of least privilege
  - Programs, users and systems should be given just enough privileges to perform their tasks

### **Domain of Protection**

- A computer system is a collection of processes and objects.
  - Hardware objects
  - Software objects
- □ A process should be allowed to access
  - only those resources for which it has authorization.
    - Currently requires to complete its task

### **Domain Structure**

Access-right = <object-name, rights-set> where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object.





### **Domain of Protection**

- A domain can be realized in a variety of ways:
  - Each user may be a domain
  - Each process may be a domain
    - Each procedure may be domain

# **Domain Implementation (UNIX)**

- System consists of 2 domains:
  - User
  - Supervisor
- - Domain = user-id
    - Domain switch accomplished via file system.
      - Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit).
      - When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed. When execution completes user-id is reset.

## **Domain Implementation (MULTICS)**

□ Let  $D_i$  and  $D_j$  be any two domain rings. □ If  $j < i \Rightarrow D_i \subseteq D_j$ 



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### **Access Matrix**

- View protection as a matrix (access matrix)
- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- Access(i, j) is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain<sub>i</sub> can invoke on Object<sub>i</sub>

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	printer
D <sub>1</sub>	read		read	
D <sub>2</sub>				print
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>		read	execute	
D <sub>4</sub>	read write		read write	

- If a process in Domain D<sub>i</sub> tries to do "op" on object O<sub>j</sub>, then "op" must be in the access matrix.
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection.
   Operations to add, delete access rights.
   Special access rights:

   owner of O<sub>i</sub>
   copy op from O<sub>i</sub> to O<sub>j</sub>
   control D<sub>i</sub> can modify D<sub>j</sub> access rights
   transfer switch from domain D<sub>i</sub> to D<sub>j</sub>

#### Domains are treated as objects

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	$F_2$	F <sub>3</sub>	laser printer	<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	<i>D</i> <sub>2</sub>	D <sub>3</sub>	$D_4$
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	read		read			switch		
<i>D</i> <sub>2</sub>				print			switch	switch
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>		read	execute					
$D_4$	read write		read write		switch			

#### Access matrix with copy rights

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	$F_2$	$F_3$		
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	execute		write*		
D <sub>2</sub>	execute	read*	execute		
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>	execute				
(a)					
object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>		
D <sub>1</sub>	execute		write*		
D <sub>2</sub>	execute	read*	execute		
<i>D</i> <sub>3</sub>	execute	read			
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#### □ Access matrix with owner rights

object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	$F_3$	
D <sub>1</sub>	owner execute		write	
D <sub>2</sub>		read* owner	read* owner write	
$D_3$	execute			
(a)				
object domain	F <sub>1</sub>	F <sub>2</sub>	F <sub>3</sub>	
<i>D</i> <sub>1</sub>	owner execute		write	
$D_2$		owner read* write*	read* owner write	
D <sub>3</sub>		write	write	
(b)				

# Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy.
  - Mechanism
    - Mechanisms determine how something will be done
    - Operating system provides access-matrix + rules.
    - It ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced.
  - Policy
    - Policies decide what will be done
    - User dictates policy.
    - Who can access what object and in what mode.

## Implementation of access matrix

#### Global table

- A global table consists of a set of ordered triples <domain, object, rights-set>
  - It is simple,
- It can be quite large
- Access list for objects
  - Consists of ordered pairs <domain, rights-set>
  - It corresponds to the needs of users
  - Determine the set of access rights for each domain is difficult.
- Capability lists for domains
  - It is a list of objects together with the operations allowed on those objects.
    - It is useful for localizing information for a given process.

### **Implementation of Access Matrix**

Each column = Access-control list for one object Defines who can perform what operation.

```
Domain 1 = \text{Read}, Write
Domain 2 = Read
Domain 3 = Read
```



 $\Box$  Each Row = Capability List (like a key) For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects.

```
Object 1 – Read
Object 4 – Read, Write, Execute
Object 5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy
```

## **14.6 Access Control**

- Protection can be applied to non-file resources
- Solaris 10 provides role-based access control to implement least privilege
  - Privilege is right to execute system call or use an option within a system call
  - Can be assigned to processes
  - Users assigned roles granting access to privileges and programs

### **Role-based Access Control in Solaris 10**



# 14.7 Revocation of Access Rights

- Access List Delete access rights from access list.
  - Simple
    - Immediate

Capability List – Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked.

- Reacquisition
- Back-pointers
- Indirection

Keys

# 14.8 Capability-Based Systems

- □ Hydra
  - Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system.
  - Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's program; system provides access protection for use of these rights.
- Cambridge CAP System
  - Data capability provides standard read, write, execute of individual storage segments associated with object.
  - Software capability -interpretation left to the subsystem, through its protected procedures.

## **14.9 Language-Based Protection**

- Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources.
- Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardware-supported checking is unavailable.
- Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system.

## **Protection in Java 2**

- Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
- A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by the JVM.
- The protection domain indicates what operations the class can (and cannot) perform.
- If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged operation, the stack is inspected to ensure the operation can be performed by the library.

### **Stack Inspection**

protection domain:	untrusted applet	URL loader	networking
socket permission:	none	*.lucent.com:80, connect	any
class:	gui: get(url); open(addr);	get(URL u): doPrivileged { open('proxy.lucent.com:80'); } <request from="" proxy="" u=""></request>	open(Addr a): checkPermission (a, connect); connect (a);



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### **End of Chapter 14**

# **Any Question?**