

Chapter 15 Security

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Objectives

- ❑ To discuss security threats and attacks
- ❑ To explain the fundamentals of encryption, authentication, and hashing
- ❑ To examine the uses of cryptography in computing
- ❑ To describe the various countermeasures to security attacks

The Security Problem

- ❑ Security must consider external environment of the system, and protect the system resources
- ❑ Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security
- ❑ **Threat** is potential security violation
- ❑ **Attack** is attempt to breach security
- ❑ Attack can be accidental or malicious
- ❑ Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse

Security Violations


Categories

- **Breach of confidentiality**
- **Breach of integrity**
- **Breach of availability**
- **Theft of service**
- **Denial of service**

Methods

- **Masquerading (breach authentication)**
- **Replay attack**
 - Message modification**
- **Man-in-the-middle attack**
- **Session hijacking**

Standard Security Attacks



Security Measure Levels

- Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
 - Physical
 - Human
 - Avoid **social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving**
 - Operating System
 - Network
- Security is as weak as the weakest chain

用户验证

- 操作系统经常使用的安全措施是用户验证
 - 用户持有物品（钥匙或者卡）
 - 用户的信息（密码）
 - 用户的特征属性（指纹、视网膜或者签名）


密码

- 密码是用户验证最经常使用的方法
- 缺点
 - 容易被猜到
 - 使用明显的相关信息
 - 暴力
 - 容易泄漏
 - 偷看
 - 嗅探


密码加密

- 对系统的密码进行加密
- 通常使用一个不可逆的函数 $f(x)$ 对用户的密码进行加密保存
- $F(x)$ 也就是通常所说的加密算法
- 要注意加密文件的保存
- UNIX系统在加密之前对口令拼加“salt”
 - salt是随机产生的长度为12bit的附加位，将其与口令 s (56bit) 串接在一起，然后对其结果再运行crypt(3)算法，加密后的结果连同salt一起保存在passwd文件中

UNIX口令载入



UNIX口令验证




一次性密码

- 一个对话开始时，系统随机选择并提供一个密码对的一部分，用户必须提供另外一部分
- 比如，每次系统提供给用户一个整数，用户使用一定的函数对该整数进行计算，并把结果提供给系统，系统自身也对该整数进行计算，然后比较结果。
- 优点是每次使用的密码都不同，不怕泄漏


生物识别技术

- 我们手掌及其手指、脚、脚趾内侧表面的皮肤凸凹不平产生的纹路会形成各种各样的图案。这些纹路的存在增加了皮肤表面的摩擦力，使得我们能够用手来抓起重物。人们也注意到，包括指纹在内的这些皮肤的纹路在图案、断点和交叉点上各不相同，也就是说，是唯一的。依靠这种唯一性，我们就可以把一个人同他的指纹对应起来，通过比较他的指纹和预先保存的指纹进行比较，就可以验证他的真实身份。这种依靠人体的身体特征来进行身份验证的技术称为**生物识别技术**，指纹识别是生物识别技术的一种。


指纹识别



虹膜识别



视网膜识别



其他生物识别技术

- 脸谱识别
- 声音识别
- 签字识别
- 耳朵轮廓识别

Program Threats


- Trojan Horse
 - Code segment that misuses its environment
 - Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
 - **Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels**
- Trap Door
 - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
 - Could be included in a compiler
- Logic Bomb
 - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
- Stack and Buffer Overflow
 - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)

C Program with Buffer-overflow Condition

```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buffer[BUFFER SIZE];
    if (argc < 2)
        return -1;
    else {
        strcpy(buffer,argv[1]);
        return 0;
    }
}
```




Layout of Typical Stack Frame



Modified Shell Code

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    execvp(“\bin\sh”, “\bin \sh”, NULL);
    return 0;
}
```

Hypothetical Stack Frame



Program Threats (Cont.)

□ Viruses

- Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- Usually borne via email or as a macro


□ Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()  
Dim oFS  
    Set oFS =  
    CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')  
    vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format  
    c:'' ,vbHide)  
End Sub
```


Program Threats (Cont.)

- **Virus dropper** inserts virus onto the system
- Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses
 - File
 - Boot
 - Macro
 - Source code
 - Polymorphic
 - Encrypted
 - Stealth
 - Tunneling
 - Multipartite
 - Armored

A Boot-sector Computer Virus



病毒

- 病毒不是一个独立的程序，而是寄生于某一合法程序(通常是一个可执行程序)上的一段代码，其危害包括两个方面：
 - 传播，使其它文件感染上该病毒；
 - 破坏，具体破坏动作多种多样，如删除系统文件。
- 病毒传播的途径
 - 用户从公共计算机上下载带病毒的程序
 - 交换已经被感染的磁盘

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 20世纪60年代初，美国贝尔实验室三个年轻的程序员编写了一个名为“磁芯大战”的游戏，游戏中的一方通过复制自身来摆脱对方的控制，这就是所谓“计算机病毒第一个雏形”。
- 20世纪70年代，美国作家雷恩在其出版的《P1的青春》一书中构思了一种能够自我复制的计算机程序，并第一次称之为“计算机病毒”。

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 到了20世纪80年代后期，巴基斯坦有两个以编软件为生的兄弟（也就是现在的程序员），他们为了打击那些盗版软件的使用者，设计出了一个名为“巴基斯坦智囊”的病毒，该病毒只传染软盘引导区。这就是最早在世界上流行的第一个真正的病毒。
- 1988年至1989年，我国也相继出现了能感染硬盘和软盘引导区的Stoned（石头）病毒，该病毒替代代码中有明显的标志“Your Pc is now Stoned!”。

20世纪90年代以前病毒的弱点

- ❑ 被感染的文件大小明显增加
- ❑ 病毒代码主体没有加密。
- ❑ 访问文件的日期得到更新。
- ❑ 很容易被debug工具跟踪

这些病毒中，稍微有点对抗反病毒手段的只有Yankee Doole病毒，当它发现你用Debug工具跟踪它的时候，它会自动从文件中消失。

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 接着，就出现了一些能对自身进行简单加密的病毒，譬如当内存有1741病毒，用DIR列目录表的时候，这个病毒就会掩盖被感染文件后增加的字节数，使人看起来文件的大小没有什么变化。
- 1992年以后，出现了是一种叫做DIR2的病毒，这种病毒非常典型，并且其整个程序大小只有263个字节。

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 20世纪内，绝大多数病毒是基于DOS系统的，有80%的病毒能在Windows中传染。
- 宏病毒的出现，代表有美丽莎，台湾一号等
- 病毒生产机现身，1996年下半年在国内终于发现了“G2、IVP、VCL”三种“病毒生产机软件”

计算机病毒的发展过程

- Internet的广泛应用，激发了病毒的活力。病毒通过网络的快速传播和破坏，为世界带来了一次一次的巨大灾难。
- 1998年2月，台湾的陈盈豪，编写出了破坏性极大的恶性病毒CIH-1.2版，并定于每年的4月26日发作破坏



CIH特点

- 通过网络（软件下载）传播
- 全球有超过6000万台的机器被感染
- 第一个能够破坏计算机硬件的病毒
- 全球直接经济损失超过10亿美元

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 1999年2月，“美丽莎”病毒席卷了整个欧美大陆
- 这是世界上最大的一次病毒浩劫，也是最大的一次网络蠕虫大泛滥。

“美丽莎” 介绍



- 大卫·史密斯，美国新泽西州工程师
- 在16小时内席卷全球互联网
- 至少造成10亿美元的损失！
- 通过email传播
- 传播规模（50的n次方，n为传播的次数）

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 2000年5月，在欧美又爆发了“爱虫”网络蠕虫病毒，造成了比“美丽莎”病毒破坏性更大的经济损失。这个病毒属于vbs脚本病毒，可以通过html, irc, email进行大量的传播。

爱虫病毒介绍



- 菲律宾“AMA”电脑大学计算机系的学生
- 一个星期内就传遍5大洲
- 微软、Intel等在内的大型企业网络系统瘫痪
- 全球经济损失达几十亿美元

爱虫病毒特点

- 通过电子邮件传播，向地址本中所有用户发带毒邮件
- 通过聊天通道IRC、VBS、网页传播
- 能删除计算机内的部分文件
- 制造大量新的电子邮件，使用户文件泄密、网络负荷剧增。
- 一年后出现的爱虫变种VBS / LoveLetter. CM它还会在Windows目录下驻留一个染有CIH病毒的文件，并将其激活。

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 再后来就出现有更多的网络蠕虫。譬如，红色代码，蓝色代码、求职者病毒、尼姆达（Nimda）、FUN_LOVE，新欢乐时光等等。

计算机病毒的发展过程

- 2001年9月18日出现的尼姆达病毒
 - 2001年最为凶猛的恶意蠕虫病毒，迄今为止已给全球带来不可估量的经济损失。
 - 该病毒不仅传播速度快、危害性强，而且自我繁殖能力更是位居各大病毒之首。
 - 已有五种新变种相继粉墨登场，作恶不可谓不大。
 - 利用unicode漏洞，与黑客技术相结合。

尼姆达病毒的传播过程

- 2001年9月18日，首先在美国出现，当天下午，有超过130,000台服务器和个人电脑受到感染。（北美洲）
- 2001年9月18日晚上，在日本、香港、南韩、新加坡和中国都收到了受到感染的报告。（亚洲）
- 2001年9月19日，有超过150000个公司被感染，西门子在他的网络受到渗透之后，被迫关掉服务器。（欧洲）


尼姆达的四种传播方式

□ 文件感染

□ Email

□ WWW

□ 局域网



SirCam 网络蠕虫病毒

- 首发于英国的恶性网络蠕虫病毒
- 触发日期：10月16日
 - 病毒行为：
 - 蠕虫将染毒机器中产生的随机文档隐藏到自身代码中；
 - 蠕虫将删除C盘上的所有文件及文件夹，仅当系统日期格式为D/M/Y（日/月/年）；
 - 每次启动时蠕虫通过向c:\recycled\sircam.sys文件中添加文本使硬盘上的空余空间被充满
- 当蠕虫执行8000次后，会停止执行。
- 直接经济损失：11.5亿美元

求职信病毒特征

- “求职信”系列变种病毒利用微软系统的漏洞，可以自动感染，无须打开附件，因此危害性很大。
- 其变种具有很强的隐蔽性，可以“随机应变”地自动更换不同的邮件主题和内容，瓦解邮件接收者的警惕性。
- 在邮件内部存放发送信息的一部分，这些变种病毒会伪造虚假信息，掩盖病毒的真实来源。


“中国黑客” 介绍

- 2002年6月6日，“中国黑客”病毒出现，它发明了全球首创的“多线程”技术。
 - 主线程：往硬盘写入病毒文件或感染其他执行文件。
 - 分线程1：监视主线程并保证主线程的运行，一旦主线程被清除，这个监视器就将主病毒体再次调入。
 - 分线程2：不断监视注册表的某个值（run项），一旦被人工或反病毒软件修改，他立即重新写入这个值，保证自己下次启动时拿到控制权。

15.3 System and Network Threats

- ❑ Worms – use **spawn** mechanism; standalone program
- ❑ Internet worm
 - Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in *finger* and *sendmail* programs
 - **Grappling hook** program uploaded main worm program
- ❑ Port scanning
 - Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
- ❑ Denial of Service
 - Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
 - Distributed denial-of-service (**DDOS**) come from multiple sites at once

The Morris Internet Worm



□ 1988 , Morris

□ Eugene H. Spafford


- worm is a program that can run by itself and can propagate a fully working version of itself to other machines.



Cryptography as a Security Tool

- Broadest security tool available
 - Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography
 - Means to constrain potential senders (*sources*) and / or receivers (*destinations*) of messages
- Based on secrets (**keys**)

Secure Communication over Insecure Medium



Encryption

- Encryption algorithm consists of
 - Set of K keys
 - Set of M Messages
 - Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
 - A function $E : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $E(k)$ is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages.
 - Both E and $E(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
 - A function $D : K \rightarrow (C \rightarrow M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $D(k)$ is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts.
 - Both D and $D(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
- An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute m such that $E(k)(m) = c$ only if it possesses $D(k)$.
 - Thus, a computer holding $D(k)$ can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding $D(k)$ cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
 - Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive $D(k)$ from the ciphertexts

Symmetric Encryption

- ❑ Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
 - $E(k)$ can be derived from $D(k)$, and vice versa
- ❑ DES (Data Encryption Standard) is most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm (created by US Govt)
 - Encrypts a block of data at a time
- ❑ Triple-DES considered more secure
- ❑ Advanced Encryption Standard (**AES**), **twofish** up and coming
- ❑ RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities
 - Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)
 - Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator
 - ❑ Generates an infinite **keystream**

Asymmetric Encryption

- Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:
 - public key – published key used to encrypt data
 - private key – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
 - Most common is RSA block cipher
 - Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
 - No efficient algorithm is known for finding the prime factors of a number


Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)

- Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive $D(k_d, N)$ from $E(k_e, N)$, and so $E(k_e, N)$ need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
 - $E(k_e, N)$ (or just k_e) is the **public key**
 - $D(k_d, N)$ (or just k_d) is the **private key**
 - N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q (for example, p and q are 512 bits each)
 - Encryption algorithm is $E(k_e, N)(m) = m^{k_e} \bmod N$, where k_e satisfies $k_e k_d \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
 - The decryption algorithm is then $D(k_d, N)(c) = c^{k_d} \bmod N$

Asymmetric Encryption Example

- For example. make $p = 7$ and $q = 13$
- We then calculate $N = 7 * 13 = 91$ and $(p-1)(q-1) = 72$
- We next select k_e relatively prime to 72 and < 72 , yielding 5
- Finally, we calculate k_d such that $k_e k_d \bmod 72 = 1$, yielding 29
- We now have our keys
 - Public key, $k_e, N = 5, 91$
 - Private key, $k_d, N = 29, 91$
- Encrypting the message 69 with the public key results in the ciphertext 62
- Ciphertext can be decoded with the private key
 - Public key can be distributed in cleartext to anyone who wants to communicate with holder of public key

Encryption and Decryption using RSA Asymmetric Cryptography



Cryptography (Cont.)

- Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
 - Asymmetric much more compute intensive
 - Typically not used for bulk data encryption

Authentication

- Constraining set of potential senders of a message
 - Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption
 - Also can prove message unmodified
- Algorithm components
 - A set K of keys
 - A set M of messages
 - A set A of authenticators
 - A function $S : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow A)$
 - That is, for each $k \in K$, $S(k)$ is a function for generating authenticators from messages
 - Both S and $S(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - A function $V : K \rightarrow (M \times A \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\})$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $V(k)$ is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
 - Both V and $V(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions

Authentication (Cont.)

- ❑ For a message m , a computer can generate an authenticator $a \in A$ such that $V(k)(m, a) = \text{true}$ only if it possesses $S(k)$
- ❑ Thus, computer holding $S(k)$ can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing $V(k)$ can verify them
- ❑ Computer not holding $S(k)$ cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using $V(k)$
- ❑ Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive $S(k)$ from the authenticators

Authentication – Hash Functions

- Basis of authentication
- Creates small, fixed-size block of data (**message digest, hash value**) from m
- Hash Function H must be collision resistant on m
 - Must be infeasible to find an $m' \neq m$ such that $H(m) = H(m')$
- If $H(m) = H(m')$, then $m = m'$
 - The message has not been modified
- Common message-digest functions include **MD5**, which produces a 128-bit hash, and **SHA-1**, which outputs a 160-bit hash

Authentication - MAC

- ❑ Symmetric encryption used in **message-authentication code (MAC)** authentication algorithm
- ❑ Simple example:
 - MAC defines $S(k)(m) = f(k, H(m))$
 - ❑ Where f is a function that is one-way on its first argument
 - k cannot be derived from $f(k, H(m))$
 - ❑ Because of the collision resistance in the hash function, reasonably assured no other message could create the same MAC
 - ❑ A suitable verification algorithm is $V(k)(m, a) \equiv (f(k, m) = a)$
 - ❑ Note that k is needed to compute both $S(k)$ and $V(k)$, so anyone able to compute one can compute the other

Authentication – Digital Signature

- Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
- Authenticators produced are **digital signatures**
- In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive $S(k_s)$ from $V(k_v)$
 - V is a one-way function
 - Thus, k_v is the public key and k_s is the private key
- Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
 - Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
 - Digital signature of message $S(k_s)(m) = H(m)^{k_s} \bmod N$
 - The key k_s again is a pair d, N , where N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q
 - Verification algorithm is $V(k_v)(m, a) \equiv (a^{k_v} \bmod N = H(m))$
 - Where k_v satisfies $k_v k_s \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$


Authentication (Cont.)

- Why authentication if a subset of encryption?
 - Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
 - Authenticator usually shorter than message
 - Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
 - Signed patches et al
 - Can be basis for **non-repudiation**

Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
 - Sometimes done **out-of-band**
- Asymmetric keys can proliferate – stored on **key ring**
 - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care – man-in-the-middle attack

Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography



Digital Certificates

- Proof of who or what owns a public key
- Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- Certificate authority are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions
 - They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on

Encryption Example - SSL

- ❑ Insertion of cryptography at one layer of the ISO network model (the transport layer)
- ❑ SSL – Secure Socket Layer (also called TLS)
- ❑ Cryptographic protocol that limits two computers to only exchange messages with each other
 - *Very complicated, with many variations*
- ❑ Used between web servers and browsers for secure communication (credit card numbers)
- ❑ The server is verified with a **certificate** assuring client is talking to correct server
- ❑ Asymmetric cryptography used to establish a secure **session key** (symmetric encryption) for bulk of communication during session
- ❑ Communication between each computer then uses symmetric key cryptography

User Authentication

- ❑ Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- ❑ User identity most often established through *passwords*, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
 - Also can include something user has and /or a user attribute
- ❑ Passwords must be kept secret
 - Frequent change of passwords
 - Use of “non-guessable” passwords
 - Log all invalid access attempts
- ❑ Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used only once


Implementing Security Defenses

- ❑ **Defense in depth** is most common security theory – multiple layers of security
- ❑ Security policy describes what is being secured
- ❑ Vulnerability assessment compares real state of system / network compared to security policy
- ❑ Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
 - **Signature-based** detection spots known bad patterns
 - **Anomaly detection** spots differences from normal behavior
 - ❑ Can detect **zero-day attacks**
 - **False-positives** and **false-negatives** a problem
- ❑ Virus protection
- ❑ Auditing, accounting, and logging of all or specific system or network activities


Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- ❑ A network firewall is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
 - The firewall limits network access between these two security domains
- ❑ Can be tunneled or spoofed
 - Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e. telnet inside of HTTP)
 - Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- ❑ **Personal firewall** is software layer on given host
 - Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- ❑ **Application proxy firewall** understands application protocol and can control them (i.e. SMTP)
- ❑ **System-call firewall** monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e. this program can execute that system call)

Network Security Through Domain Separation Via Firewall



Firewall



Computer Security Classifications

- ❑ U.S. Department of Defense outlines four divisions of computer security: **A**, **B**, **C**, and **D**.
- ❑ **D** – Minimal security.
- ❑ **C** – Provides discretionary protection through auditing. Divided into **C1** and **C2**. **C1** identifies cooperating users with the same level of protection. **C2** allows user-level access control.
- ❑ **B** – All the properties of **C**, however each object may have unique sensitivity labels. Divided into **B1**, **B2**, and **B3**.
- ❑ **A** – Uses formal design and verification techniques to ensure security.

Example: Windows XP

- Security is based on user accounts
 - Each user has unique security ID
 - Login to ID creates **security access token**
 - Includes security ID for user, for user's groups, and special privileges
 - Every process gets copy of token
 - System checks token to determine if access allowed or denied
- Uses a subject model to ensure access security. A subject tracks and manages permissions for each program that a user runs
- Each object in Windows XP has a security attribute defined by a security descriptor
 - For example, a file has a security descriptor that indicates the access permissions for all users

End of Chapter 15

Any Question?